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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JOSE RUIZ,
Appellate Court No,
940661-CA

Plaintiff/Appellant,
vs.

District Court No.
910900648

SOUTHERN PACIFIC
TRANSPORTATION COMPANY,

(Priority No. 15)
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
Pursuant to Rules 24 and 26 of the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, Defendant/Appellee, Southern Pacific
Transportation Company (hereafter "Defendant" or "Southern
Pacific"), hereby files its brief in opposition to the brief
filed by Plaintiff/Appellant, Jose Ruiz (hereafter "Plaintiff" or
"Ruiz").

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (k) (1992) and Rule 3 of the Utah Rules
of Appellate Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUE AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The sole issue on appeal is whether the district court
was correct in ruling that Plaintiff was not acting within the
course of his employment and, therefore, could not bring an
action against his employer, Southern Pacific, under 45 U.S.C. §
190X77032 1
06/13/95
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51 ("FELA").

The court below concluded "that defendant was not

in the course of his employment as a matter of law," and granted
summary judgment for Defendant.
Plaintiff appeals.

It is from this order only that

It merely is the correctness of this ruling

that is reviewed on appeal, and this Court may affirm the grant
of summary judgment on any basis, even if not relied on below.
Hill v. Seattle First National Bank, 827 P.2d 241, 246 (Utah
1992); State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Geary, 869 P.2d 952, 954
(Utah App. 1994).
The ruling of the lower court does not grant complete
relief to the Defendant.

The ruling only precludes the Plaintiff

from maintaining an action under the FELA.

Plaintiff also has

sued the Defendant for common law negligence in a separate
action.

Jose Ruiz v. Southern Pacific Transportation Company,

Civil No. 940900197 (pending in the Second Judicial District
Court of Weber County, State of Utah).

The resolution of this

appeal will not affect that separate suit.

FEDERAL STATUTE AT ISSUE
The determination of the issue appealed by Plaintiff
will require this Court to interpret 45 U.S.C. § 51 which reads,
in pertinent part, as follows:
Every common carrier by railroad while
engaged in commerce between any of the
several States . . . shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while
he is employed by such carrier in such
commerce . . . resulting in whole or in part
from the negligence of . . . such carrier . .
(Emphasis added.)

Plaintiff cites also to the second paragraph of this
statute.
Court.

However, it is not relevant to the issue before this
The second paragraph only clarifies that an employee's

duties for his employer furthers interstate commerce, for
purposes of this statute, when the duties in "any way directly or
closely and substantially, affect such commerce."

As stated

above, the issue here is not whether Ruiz was performing duties
that furthered interstate commerce, but more fundamentally
whether Ruiz was performing any employment duties for Defendant
at the time he was injured.

Since the court below found as a

matter of law from the record before it that Plaintiff was not
acting within the course of his employment, the issue of whether
or not his conduct also furthered interstate commerce was
rendered moot and was not decided.

Likewise, this Court need not

consider the second paragraph of 45 U.S.C. § 51 that was cited by
Plaintiff.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
The relevant facts of record relied upon by the
district court are not disputed.

Plaintiff simply argues for

legal conclusions that the district court rejected.
A. Relevant Facts
1.

Plaintiff seeks herein to recover from his

employer, Southern Pacific, for personal injuries he sustained on
May 18, 1990.
upon the FELA.
2.

Plaintiff's claim in this action is based solely
(R. at 1.)
In May 1990, Plaintiff was an employee of

Defendant assigned to work on Defendant's tracks and right-of-way

at Lakeside, Utah which required him, and the other members of
his work gang, to live at Defendant's work camp at Montello,
Nevada.

Montello is approximately 75 miles from Lakeside.

(R.

174-75. 254.)
3.

The entire work gang customarily gathered

together at Montello at 5:00 a.m. and traveled together to the
work site at Lakeside by company truck, which would take
approximately two hours, during which time they were under the
Defendant's control and direction and were paid for their time.
(R. 175-76, 259-60, 304.)
4.

However, prior to the date of the accident,

Plaintiff voluntarily requested permission not to travel to
Lakeside with the other gang members in the company truck
because, for his own convenience, he wanted to have his own
vehicle at Lakeside with him so he could leave directly from
Lakeside for his home in Ogden, Utah rather than returning that
evening to Montello with his gang.
5.

(R. 175, 305-14, 498-99.)

Plaintiff's request was granted by his supervisor

with the understanding that since Plaintiff would not be under
Southern Pacific's supervision Plaintiff would not be paid for
his time nor reimbursed for his use of his own vehicle.
6.

(Id.)

On the day of the accident, Plaintiff did not

gather with the rest of the work gang in the company truck, or
submit himself to the supervision or control of the Defendant,
but left after the gang left, in his own car, in order to travel
at and for his own convenience to the work site at Lakeside.
175, 311-15.)
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(R.

7.

On that day, Plaintiff's on duty point, for the

purpose of receiving compensation, was agreed to be Lakeside.
(R. 314, 414.)
8.

Plaintiff was not paid for the time he spent

commuting in his car that day, nor was he reimbursed for his own
use of his vehicle.
9.

(R. 176.)

Plaintiff was injured in a rollover accident 14

miles away from Lakeside, before he had reported for duty at
Lakeside.

(R. 166-68, 287, 395.)

B. Irrelevant and Incorrect Statements of Plaintiff
10.

Defendant agrees that the agreement between

Defendant and its maintenance of way employees ("Union
Agreement") provides that normally "Employees' time shall start
and end at regular designated assembly points."
22(a).)

(R. 350, Rule

However, this fact, which was stated by Plaintiff, is

irrelevant because Plaintiff did not assemble with his gang, nor
submit himself to the supervision or control of the Defendant, at
the designated assembly point at Montello on the day of the
accident.

At Plaintiff's request, he agreed with Defendant that

on that day he would not assemble with the rest of the gang until
he arrived at Lakeside.
11.

(See paragraphs 4-7 above.)

Defendant also agrees that it provided living

facilities at Montello for Plaintiff, but this fact also is
irrelevant because Plaintiff was not injured at Montello, nor did
Plaintiff assemble with this gang and submit to the supervision
or control of Defendant at Montello.

Under these facts, it is

irrelevant that Montello be designated as the "headquarter" or
"designated assembly point" for purposes of computing
190X77032 1
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compensation generally under the Union Agreement.

Plaintiff was

injured when he crashed while driving his own car, for his own
purposes, 14 miles from the work site at Lakeside and 64 miles
from Montello.

(See paragraphs 4-7 above; see also paragraph 24

of Plaintiff's Statement of the Facts.)
12.

Plaintiff is wrong in stating in paragraphs 14

and 22 of his Statement of Facts that the Union Agreement
entitled Plaintiff to be compensated for his personal commute on
the day of the accident, and that his starting time, for purposes
of compensation, could not be altered.

The Union Agreement

speaks for itself and does not state that employees are entitled
to be paid for time spent using their own vehicles for their own
purposes rather than time spent after assembling and submitting
to the supervision and control of the Defendant for which it
provides they are paid.

To the contrary, the Union Agreement

specifically provides that "[e]mployees shall not be allowed time
while traveling . . . between their homes and designated
assembling points, or for other personal reasons."
13.

(R. 369.)

Rather than citing to the specific language of

the Union Agreement, Plaintiff relies on the Declaration of
Robert Douglas in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary
Judgment (R. 417) as the basis for his statements in paragraphs
14 and 22 of his Statement of Facts.

However, plaintiff fails to

inform the Court that Defendant moved to strike this declaration
on the grounds that it lacks proper foundation and makes hearsay
statements and improper conclusions of law in interpreting the
Union Agreement.

(R. 420-27.)

14.

Moreover, these incorrect statements are

immaterial because, as Plaintiff admits at paragraph 28 of his
Statement of Facts, a claim for violation of the Union Agreement
must be brought within 6 0 days from the date of occurrence and no
claim ever has been brought.

There is no admissible evidence of

record that Plaintiff was entitled to be compensated for his
personal commute.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Plaintiff is not entitled to pursue the instant action
against Defendant to recover for his personal injuries because
his injuries occurred while he was acting outside the course of
his employment.

Under the FELA, which is the legal basis for

Plaintiff's action, Plaintiff only is entitled to recover from
Defendant if he can prove he was injured because of Defendant's
negligence while he was working in the course of his employment
for Defendant.
The facts of record are undisputed that rather than
performing any duties for Defendant, Plaintiff was furthering his
own objectives when he was injured while he was driving his own
vehicle to Lakeside where he was to report to work.

The law also

is undisputed that the relevant factors to be considered in
deciding this issue include the employee's ability to chose his
own conduct and the employer's lack of control and supervision
over the employee.

All the cases cited by Plaintiff support this

conclusion, even though many of those cases reach differing
conclusions because of the different facts of each case.

Choice

and control are the critical factors this Court must consider in

analyzing whether Ruiz's conduct was within or without the course
of his employment when the accident occurred.
Under this analytical framework provided by FELA case
law, the only reasonable conclusion is that Plaintiff clearly had
total control and freedom to choose what he would do on his way
to the work site and when he would do it, as does every commuter
on the way to work.

Defendant, on the other hand, had no control

over Plaintiff and received no benefit from what Plaintiff had
chosen to do, and it would receive no benefit until Plaintiff
arrived at the work site to perform his duties.

Plaintiff simply

was commuting, as the district court held, and all case law is in
accord that commuters are not within the course of their
employment under the FELA.
Upon the undisputed facts and uncontroverted, relevant
legal authority, summary judgment is necessary in this case
because, as a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot prove he was
injured while acting within the course of his employment.

The

judgment of the district court should be affirmed, and Defendant
should be awarded its costs.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE FELA ONLY APPLIES IF THE PLAINTIFF
WAS ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT.
Railroads are not insurers of the safety of their
employees.

In order to recover for on-the-job injuries under the

FELA, an employee must prove the negligence of his employer.
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Saxon, 284 U.S. 458,
459 (1932); O'Hara v. Long Island Railroad Co., 665 F.2d 8, 9
190X77032 1
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(2nd Cir. 1981); Lessee v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 690 P.2d
596, 599 (Wash. App. 1984).

Even more fundamental, however, is

the requirement that an injured employee must prove he was
injured while acting within the course of his employment.

Moore

v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co., 649 F.2d 1004, 1008 (4th Cir.
1981); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. Wottle, 193
F.2d 628, 629 (10th Cir. 1952), cert, granted, 343 U.S. 963
(1952), and cert, dismissed, 344 U.S. 850 (1952); Williams v.
Norfolk Southern Railway Co., 767 F. Supp. 756, 758 (E.D. Va.
1991).

It is this narrow, legal question of what constitutes

course of employment that is now before this Court.

If the

undisputed facts indeed establish, as the district court found,
that Ruiz was not acting within the course of his employment with
Southern Pacific at the time he was injured, summary judgment was
properly granted as a matter of law.
Prior to 193 9, the FELA had been interpreted to provide
a cause of action for on-the-job injuries only for employees who
were "at the time of the injury engaged in interstate
transportation, or in work so closely related to it as to be
practically a part of it."

Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351

U.S. 493, 496-97 (1956), citing. Shanks v. Delaware, Lackawanna &
Western Railroad Co., 239 U.S. 556, 558 (1916).

A railroad

employee, thus, was not covered by the FELA even if he was
injured while acting within the scope of his employment unless
the specific activity he was doing at the time was in furtherance
of interstate commerce.
The 1939 amendment to the FELA, discussed by Plaintiff
in his brief, merely abolished this "moment of injury" rule.

Southern Pacific Co. v. Gileo, 351 U.S. at 497-98.

See also Reed

v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 351 U.S. 502, 504 (1956) . Hence,
the FELA now covers a work-related injury when any part of the
employee's duties furthers interstate commerce, directly, closely
or substantially, even if the injury occurred while the employee
was at the time performing duties not directly related to
interstate transportation.

351 U.S. at 499.

This point never

has been disputed by Defendant.
The 193 9 amendment is discussed here by Defendant only
because Plaintiff argued that it was relevant to the issue before
this Court.

It is not relevant.

This amendment did not expand,

or even address, the fact that a railroad employee must be
injured within the course of his employment to be covered under
the FELA.

Off duty injuries never have been covered and the 193 9

amendment did nothing to change this fact.

Nothing in this 1939

amendment changes the conclusion "that Congress used the words
'employ' and 'employed' in the statute in their natural sense,
and intended to describe the conventional relation of employer
and employee."

Robinson v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co., 237

U.S. 84, 94 (1915) . Hence, the single issue remains:

"Was

Plaintiff acting within the course of his employment with
Defendant at the time he drove his car off the road?"

If not, he

cannot assert a negligence claim against Defendant under the FELA
and this cause of action was properly dismissed as a matter of

law.1

The law and facts support the conclusion of the district

court in this regard.
POINT II
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT ACTING WITHIN THE COURSE OF HIS
EMPLOYMENT WHEN HE ROLLED HIS AUTOMOBILE
ON THE WAY TO REPORT FOR DUTY.
"Course of employment" is defined generally to mean
that "the worker is doing the duty he is employed to perform."
Black's Law Dictionary 352 (6th ed. 1990).
different under the FELA.

This definition is no

See Rogers v. Chicago & North Western

Transportation Co., 947 F.2d 837, 839 n.4 (7th Cir. 1991); Wilson
v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 841 F.2d
1347, 1352 (7th Cir. 1988), cert, dismissed, 487 U.S. 1244
(1988).

See also Restatement (Second) of Agency § 229 cmt. c

(1958).

As shown in the cases discussed below, which were cited

by Plaintiff, the basic factors of the employer's control and
supervision over the employee and the employee's lack of choice
over his own actions at the time of injury remain the same.

In

the case at bar, an analysis of the facts as applied to these
factors conclusively support the district court's holding that
Ruiz was acting outside the course of his employment when he was
injured.
On the day of the accident, Plaintiff voluntarily chose
to drive his own automobile rather than travel to the work site
in Defendant's truck, as was the custom and practice.
x

On that

As noted above, if Plaintiff was not acting within the
course of his employment he still can pursue his action against
Defendant for common law negligence in the separate action he
already has filed. See Jose Ruiz v. Southern Pacific
Transportation Company, Civil No. 940900197 (pending in the
Second Judicial District Court of Weber County, State of Utah).

day only, Plaintiff decided when he would leave for the work
site, and in fact left after the rest of the gang departed in
Defendant's truck.

Only Plaintiff had control over when he left

to go to the work site, the condition of his automobile and the
manner in which he drove it.

Defendant had no ability to control

or supervise Plaintiff, as it did the other workers who submitted
to Defendant's control and travelled together in Defendant's
truck under the supervision of the gang's foreman.

Defendant

received no benefit from Plaintiff's voluntary choice to reject
Defendant's mode of transportation in order to further his
private objective of taking his car to work with him so he could
get home earlier that night.

With these facts, relevant case law

supports finding that Plaintiff was acting outside the course of
his employment and that the FELA does not provide Plaintiff a
cause of action against the Southern Pacific.
The issue of when an employee acts outside the course
of his employment has arisen under varying factual circumstances.
Most analogous to the facts of the instant action are cases
commonly referred to as "commuter cases."

Commuter cases

generally involve the factual situation of an employee travelling
under his own volition, and without his employer's supervision,
to or from his work site in a manner chosen by the employee
without compulsion by the employer.

In these cases, it is

established that employees are outside the course of their
employment even if they are on their employer's property or
riding on their employer's train or vehicle.
For example, Young v. New York, New Haven & Hartford
Railroad Co., 74 F.2d 251 (2nd Cir. 1934), involved a fireman who

had finished his run and had left his job.

However, while on his

way home, the fireman was riding on one of his employer's
locomotives when he was injured.

Judge Learned Hand found the

fireman was not acting within the course of his employment at the
time he was injured.

As Plaintiff points out in his brief, a

critical fact influencing Judge Hand in Young was that the
plaintiff exercised his choice to get home on his employer's
locomotive and that this choice "had nothing to do with his
employment, and could scarcely concern his relations with the
defendant."

Id. at 253.

On a second appeal, the court again

held as a matter of law that the plaintiff was outside the course
of his employment when he was injured.

In this decision, the

court considered to be significant the facts that the plaintiff
had ceased the specific duties of his job, his pay had ended, and
he chose the means by which he rode home.

Young v. New York, New

Haven & Hartford Railroad Co., 79 F.2d 844, 845 (2nd Cir. 1935).
The jury verdict for the plaintiff, consequently, was reversed as
a matter of law.

id. at 846.

In another commuter case, Sassaman v. Pennsylvania
Railroad Co., 144 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir. 1944), a train dispatcher
was held to be outside the course of his employment when he was
injured while getting off of one of his employer's trains that he
took from the station where he worked to the station where he
lived after his day's work.

Again, Plaintiff in the case at bar

points out that the court in Sassaman, after discussing the cases
Plaintiff relies upon in this appeal, held that Mr. Sassaman was
outside the course of his employment, under the FELA, because he
chose to ride his employer's train to get home instead of taking

other available transportation.

Id. at 953.

The court found

that it was significant that the plaintiff's employer did not
compel the plaintiff in the mode of travel he used to get to and
from the place he was to perform his duties.

id.

The employee's ability to choose also was considered to
be a significant factor in Quirk v. New York, Chicago & St. Louis
Railroad Co., 189 F.2d 97 (7th Cir. 1951), cert, denied. 342 U.S.
871 (1951).

In Quirk, the court affirmed an order of the

district court that the plaintiff's decedent, who was a track
foreman, was outside the course of his employment as a matter of
law when he was killed while driving one of his employer's
motorcars on his employer's track, since the plaintiff's decedent
was doing so pursuant to his own choice.

Id. at 100.

He had the

freedom of remaining where his work had ceased, being provided
meals and lodging by his employer, or going home for the night.
Id.

Moreover, the court held that the plaintiff's decedent's

mere use of the defendant's motorcar for part of his voluntary
trip home would not "reestablish the relationship which the
decedent by his voluntary act had previously severed."
101.

Id. at

The court reasoned:
Certainly it cannot be thought that this
action of the decedent was for the purpose of
discharging any duty incident to or in
connection with his employment. When he left
Muncie, he was engaged solely in a personal
activity unrelated to his duties as an
employee of the defendant. (Id. at 100.)
Related to the employee's exercise of his own choice is

the factor that the employer has no control over the employee or
the risks the employee may take in order to get to or from the
work site.

This interrelationship between the employee's choice

and the employer's lack of control was discussed in Williams v.
Norfolk Southern Railway Co.. 767 F. Supp. 756 (E.D. Va. 1991).
In the Williams case, the plaintiff was a maintenance of way
employee who travelled to his designated assembly point and back
in different ways including on an Amtrak train with a pass
provided to him by his employer.

The plaintiff could get to the

assembly point any way he chose, but he then completed the trip
to the work site on his employer's rail sidecar.

He was paid

only after submitting himself for the ride on the defendant's
sidecar.

The plaintiff was injured on his way home while riding

the Amtrak train.

In holding that the plaintiff was outside the

course of his employment, the court stated:
The justification for the [commuter] rule's
limitation of FELA coverage is the employer's
lack of control over the risks associated
with commuter travel. By limiting FELA to
injuries suffered by plaintiff "while he is
employed," Congress chose to limit FELA's
additional burdens on employers to those
risks over which the employer had substantial
control. Amtrak travel, like private auto
travel, had plaintiff chosen it, was not part
of plaintiff's job, nor did Norfolk Southern
have substantial control over the risks
associated with either mode of travel . . . .
In short, FELA was enacted to protect railway
workers against the dangers of actual railway
work, not against the risks of commuting.
(Id. at 759.) (Emphasis added.)
Although the foregoing cases involved commuting home
from work, the same rule is applied with respect to employees
commuting to work.

In Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d

173 (1st Cir. 1959), a flagman was held to be outside the course
of his employment when he was injured while travelling on his
employer's train to join his crew at the point where he was to
start his work.
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After reviewing the case authority, the court
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found the plaintiff to have been outside the course of his
employment because he was not required to be on his employer's
train in order to get to work.

Id. at 178.

Choice and lack of control also was pivotal in
Spoonamore v. Louisville and Nashville Railroad Co., 179 F. Supp.
290 (E.D. Ky. 1959).

Mr. Spoonamore was an engineer who was

injured in an automobile accident while on his way to where he
was to meet his train.

In holding as a matter of law that the

plaintiff was outside his employment at the time, the court
stated that plaintiff's mode of travel "was entirely a matter of
his own voluntary choice for reasons personal to him.

It was a

matter over which the railroad exercised no direction nor
control."

Id. at 2 92.
In Getty v. Boston & Marine Corp., 505 F.2d 1226 (1st

Cir. 1974), a railroad carman fell on his employer's property
while going to board one of his employer's trains to travel to
his place of employment.

Again because the carman exercised his

choice to use his employer's train to get to work, the commuter
rule applied and the denial of FELA coverage was affirmed.
at 1228.

Id.

The court in Getty makes it clear that the result may

have been different if the carman had been required to face
unique hazards or his freedom of choice as to means of travel had
been taken away.

Id.

Again, choice and lack of control were

considered as critical factors.
The significance of these factors was highlighted again
in the recent case of Thompson v. National Railroad Passenger
Corp., 774 F. Supp. 1087 (N.D. 111. 1991), aff'd, 966 F.2d 1457
(7th Cir. 19 92).

In the Thompson case, summary judgment was

granted for the employer because its employee, a waiter, was not
within the course of his employment when injured while riding on
his employer's train to where he was to board his regular train.
No issue of fact existed that the plaintiff was not required to
ride his employer's train to work, and he was not at the time
subject to the orders of his supervisors.

Id. at 1088.

Supporting the fact that the employer had no control over the
plaintiff was the fact that the plaintiff was not paid for his
time spent during the commute.

Id.

Applying the common factors considered by these courts
compels the conclusion that the court below properly granted
summary judgment for Defendant.

Ruiz voluntarily rejected going

with the Defendant to the work site on the day of the accident,
although Ruiz had the opportunity to do so and in fact
customarily had submitted himself to the control and supervision
of Defendant on previous occasions in getting to the work site.
Plaintiff elected to go to the work site by himself in his own
automobile for his own personal reason of having his car
available to him to use in getting home from work earlier.

In

other words, he did not have to drive to the work site in his own
car in order to do his work that day.

He voluntarily drove for

his own benefit.
In addition, because Plaintiff chose not to start his
work at the work camp with his gang and go with them in
Defendant's truck to the work site, Defendant had no control over
when, or if, Plaintiff would leave the camp site or arrive at the
work site to report for duty, nor did Defendant have any control
over the Plaintiff's car or his use of his car.
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As further

evidence of the existence of these facts, Plaintiff voluntarily
chose not to be paid until he reported for duty at the work site,
and in fact, Defendant never has paid Plaintiff for that time he
spent pursuing his own interests.
This case falls squarely within the reasoning of the
commuter cases that deny FELA coverage.

Therefore, the court

below was correct in granting summary judgment as a matter of
law.
POINT III
THE LEGAL AUTHORITY RELIED UPON BY PLAINTIFF IS
INAPPLICABLE ON THE FACTS BEFORE THE COURT.
Plaintiff does not deny the existence and affect of the
line of cases known as commuter cases.

In fact, he peripherally

cites to many of those cases, yet without sufficient analysis to
show that really they conclusively support the holding of the
court below, in emphasizing other lines of cases.

These other

lines of cases apply to other factual situations that are
inapplicable where an employee is travelling pursuant to his own
choices and without the control or supervision of the employer to
where he is to report for his work assignments.

Plaintiff's

cases, therefore, do not help Plaintiff on the facts of record
before this Court.
A.

Work Camp Cases
The first line of cases argued by Plaintiff pertains to

the factual situation where an employee is injured at an employer
provided work camp.
camp" cases.

These cases are referred to herein as "work

See Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad

Co. v. Kane, 33 F.2d 866, 868 (9th Cir. 1929), cert, denied, 280

U.S. 588 (1929)(laborer who was preparing for the day at his
employer's work camp was within his employment because "he was
necessarily on appellant's premises, and was making necessary
preparations for the work in which he was to engage"); Mostyn v.
Delaware, Lackawanna & Western Railroad Co., 160 F.2d 15, 17-18
(2nd Cir. 1947), cert, denied, 332 U.S. 770 (1947)(laborer who
was asleep at his employer's work camp was within his employment
because the camp was provided by the employer for its employees
to use "to prepare themselves for their work, or to rest and
recuperate"); Casso v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 219 F.2d 303,
3 05-06 (3rd Cir. 1955)(laborer who was at his employer's work
camp and was returning to his bunk car, after having been away at
town, was within his employment for the reasons stated in Mostyn,
supra, and the fact that the employees using this housing were
subject to call at anytime of day or night); Atlantic Coast Line
Railroad v. Meeks, 208 S.W.2d 355, 358-59 (Tenn. App. 1947)
(laborer who was in his employer's "shanty car" was within his
employment because the employer furnished the camp in order to
have the services of the laborer and the laborer was subject to
call at any time so as to make the laborer's staying at the camp
a necessary incident to his employment).
These work camp cases all involve negligence which
occurred at the camp where the injured employee was required by
his employer to stay.

The employers in these cases clearly had

control over the camp facilities and benefitted from the laborers
staying at the work camps.

These cases do not suggest that an

employee choosing to leave a work camp in his own vehicle and for
his own personal benefit remains covered by the FELA while he

operates his motor vehicle at any speed and in any manner of his
own choosing.

Neither do these cases contradict the reasoning of

the applicable commuter cases discussed in Point II.

Indeed, the

Second Circuit in Mostvn specifically followed its earlier
decisions in Young v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad
Co., supra, and stated in its analysis "that any activity
undertaken by an employee for a private purpose is certainly not
within his employment."

Mostyn, 160 F.2d at 17.

The Tenth Circuit case of Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Railway Co. v. Wottle, 193 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1952) particularly
is instructive on this point.

In Wottle, a laborer, shortly

after returning from the work site to his company provided camp
site, left in his own automobile to go buy groceries for himself.
The laborer was killed while still on his employer's property
when attempting to drive over the tracks.

Id. at 630-31.

The

court in Wottle found that the laborer's own choice to drive his
own car in pursuit of his own objectives was not a necessary
incident to his employment so as to bring him within the coverage
of the FELA.

To rule otherwise, the court reasoned, would in

effect mean that "there is no limitation upon the coverage [of
the FELA] so long as there is a possibility that the employee
will return to his work-a-day duties," and then stated,
"[o]bviously, the legislation was not intended to go so far."
Id. at 631.
The Wottle decision was upheld recently in Loya v.
Denver & Rio Grande Western Railroad Co., 993 F.2d 1551 (10th
Cir. 1993)(unpublished opinion which is attached hereto).

In

Loya, summary judgment was affirmed where a laborer had left his

work camp to visit home, do laundry and buy particular foods he
liked. It is noteworthy that he was held to have been outside his
employment as a matter of law when he was injured while returning
to his work camp in his own car even though he was paid a per
diem while away.

Even though he was compensated, because the

laborer was returning from his own errands he was found not to be
within the control of his employer.

He was exercising his choice

to pursue his own interests.
There is no dispute in the law that even when an
employee is at work and would be within the course of his
employment that he can take himself outside of the course of his
employment by voluntarily pursuing personal objectives.

For

example, in addition to the cases just discussed, in Fowler v.
Seaboard Coastline Railroad Co., 638 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1981),
summary judgment for the employer was affirmed for this reason
where an employee, during a time he would have been within the
course of his employment and while on his employer's property,
voluntarily chose to pursue a personal motorcycle excursion
during which he crashed while speeding.

Also, in Rogers v.

Chicago & North Western Transportation Co., 947 F.2d 837 (7th
Cir. 1991) summary judgment again was affirmed in favor of the
employer where an employee, during a layover at the employer's
expense, voluntarily chose to jog on his employer's property
where he tripped in a hole.

By choosing to pursue personal

activities that did not benefit their employer, and over which
the employer had no control, these employees were not acting
within the course of their employment, as a matter of law, when
they were injured.

In the case at bar, Ruiz was injured while driving his
automobile for his own interest.

He was not at the work site.

He was not required to drive his own car in order to get to the
work site that day.
vehicle that day.

It was his idea and desire to drive his own
He was not under the control or direction of

Southern Pacific at the time.

Defendant did not receive any

benefit from Plaintiff's choosing to drive his own car to the
work site so he could conveniently get home sooner for the
weekend.

Plaintiff expressly agreed he would not be paid for the

time it took him to drive to the work site in his own vehicle
when he would have been paid had he travelled to the site under
the supervision of his foreman in the company truck.

Likewise,

neither was Plaintiff injured while he was at the work camp.
was injured while pursuing his own interests.

He

When he chose not

to leave the work camp with his work gang in order to pursue his
own interests he voluntarily took himself outside the course of
his employment.

The work camp cases relied upon by Plaintiff are

inapplicable to the facts of this case.
B.

Traversing the Work Site Cases
Plaintiff next relies on a line of cases that pertain

to the factual situation where an employee is injured on or near
his employer's property in order to perform the specific job to
which he is assigned.

These cases are different from the

commuter cases because the employee is injured after arriving at
the general area where his work is to be performed, and it is
found that the employee's being in the area in which he is
injured was necessary in order for the employee to get to
precisely where he needed to be in order to accomplish his work.

These cases are referred to herein as "traversing the work site"
cases.

See North Carolina Railroad Co. v. Zachary, 232 U.S. 248,

260 (1914)(fireman who already had reported for duty and had
prepared his employer's engine for a trip on which he soon would
be leaving remained within his employment when injured while
walking within the employer's yard from the engine to an unknown
location, but assumed to be an adjacent boarding house, of which
there was no evidence to indicate that he was on a personal
errand as opposed to performing his duty to his employer);

Erie

Railroad Co. v. Winfield, 244 U.S. 170 (1917)(engineer who was
injured when walking away from his employer's engine in his
employer's yard after performing his duties, at the close of his
shift, still was within his employment); Virginian Railway Co. v.
Early, 130 F.2d 548 (4th Cir. 1942)(machinist who, after parking
his car on his employer's lot, reported early to the shops where
he worked then proceeded to walk in his employer's yard to a
company endorsed lunch room established for the convenience of
the employees, in order to get a cup of coffee, and was then
injured in the yard on the way back to the shops to perform his
duties was within his employment); Lukon v. Pennsylvania Railroad
Co., 131 F.2d 327, 329 (3rd Cir. 1942)(laborer whose gang quit
one-half hour early so that they could return their employer's
tools to the tool house and who, without any tools, walked with
his gang toward the tool house along the employer's right-of-way,
which was in the same direction of his home and which was the
course he usually took to leave his employer's premises, was

within his employment when injured while on the right-of-way)2;
Morris v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 187 F.2d 837, 841 (2nd Cir.
1951)(employee who, after entering his employer's yard, had to
cross over various railroad tracks to get to where he needed to
be to report for work and perform his duties was within his
employment when killed in the yard); Carter v. Union Railroad
Co., 438 F.2d 208 (3rd Cir. 1971)(trainman who, after parking in
a lot provided by his employer, was injured while walking across
property owned by a third party, which the employer knew to be
necessary in order for its employees to get to the shanty where
they were to do their work, was within his employment);
Caillouette v. Baltimore & Ohio Chicago Terminal Railroad Co.,
705 F.2d 243 (7th Cir. 1983)(switchman who had arrived at his
employer's yard and was injured when walking toward the carmen's
shanty in order to call the yard master to request that an engine
be sent to take him to the other end of the yard where he was to
work that day was within his employment).3
2

The Third Circuit in the dissent of the more recent case of
Sassaman v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 144 F.2d 950 (3rd Cir.
1944), discussed supra in Point II, confirmed that the plaintiff
in Lukon was "still on the section on which he was ordinarily
employed" when he was injured, yet because it was possible,
although not customary, for the plaintiff to have taken another
route home other than on his employer's property, the dissent at
least thought the Lukon case had been overruled by the Sassaman
case.
3

These cases often refer to, as does Plaintiff, two non-FELA
Supreme Court cases, Bountiful Brick Co. v. Giles, 276 U.S. 154
(1928) and Cudahv Packing Co. v. Parramore, 263 U.S. 418 (1923).
In both of these cases, the imposition of liability under the
Utah Workmen's Compensation Act was affirmed because there was
found to be a "causal connection" between the injury and the
employment. 276 U.S. at 158; 263 U.S. at 423-24. In both cases,
the employee was killed while crossing over railroad tracks
adjacent to their work places which they necessarily had to cross
in order to get to where they needed to be to perform their

In all of these traversing the work site cases, as
opposed to the commuter cases, the employee was not pursuing his
own interest, nor was he exercising his own choice as to the
means by which he got to or from work.

Rather in all of these

cases, the employee already had arrived at work and was required
by his employer to go in a particular manner to the place where
the injury occurred as part of or in preparation for the
performance of his duties.

Clearly, what the employee is doing

in these cases is for the benefit of his employer because it is
incidental to the performance of his required duties.
These cases provide no help to Plaintiff under the
facts of record.

Ruiz left the camp site to pursue his own

objective, as discussed above with respect to Plaintiff's work
camp cases, and he had not yet arrived at the work site before he
drove his car off of the road.

He was 14 miles away from where

he was to report to his supervisor and obtain his assignment for
the day.

He had not yet reported to work, and he was not

traversing the work site to get to the exact location where he
was to perform his duties for Defendant on that day.
duties for their employers. Hence, although only a "causal
connection" between the injury and the employment was held to be
sufficient under the state compensation act, the analysis still
required, as do the FELA cases set forth in the text, that the
injury resulted from a risk that the employee necessarily had to
take and not a risk the employee chose to, but did not have to,
take in order to perform his duties for his employer. 276 U.S.
at 159 ("it was necessary for the employees, in order to get to
the place of work, to cross the tracks, and they were in effect
invited by the employer to do so"); 263 U.S. at 426 ("Parramore
could not, at the point of the accident, select his way. He had
no other choice than to go over the railway tracks in order to
get to his work, and he was in effect invited by his employer to
do so."). In the case at bar, Ruiz was invited to travel to the
work site with his gang in Defendant's truck, but he voluntarily
chose to drive his own car instead.

The fact that Plaintiff was on Defendant's property at
the time of his accident is not significant.

The traversing the

work site cases do not find the employee to be within his
employment because he is on his employer's property.

Many of the

employees were on their employer's property in the commuter
cases, discussed in Point II, and the employees in the Wottle,
Fowler and Rogers cases, discussed above in this point, were on
their employer's property at the time of injury, yet they were
found not to be within the course of their employment at the
time.

Conversely, in the Carter, Bountiful Brick and Cudahy

Packing cases the employees were found to be within the course of
their employment when not on their employer's property.
Obviously, the very nature of the traversing the work site cases
most likely will place the employee on his employer's property at
the time of injury, and at least very close to where the
employee's duties are to be performed.

Nevertheless, contrary to

Plaintiff's suggestion, whether or not an employee is on his
employer's property is not a determinative factor in the analysis
of whether the employee is within the course of his employment at
the time of injury.

See also Restatement (Second) of Agency §

229 cmt. c (1958) ("the fact that the acts are done upon the
master's premises or with his instrumentalities is . . . not
conclusive").
The law specifically provides that merely being on an
employer's property in order to get to work, without the
employer's control and the benefit to the employer that makes the
reason for being on the property incidental to the employment, is
not sufficient to bring the conduct within the course of

employment.

In Aldredae v. Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Co., 20

F.2d 655 (8th Cir. 1927), cert, denied, 275 U.S. 550 (1927), for
example, dismissal of an action was affirmed where the plaintiff,
a switchman, was injured after he left his home to go to work and
while walking along his employer's right-of-way.

The court found

the facts as follows:
On the night of the accident he left his home
to go to his place of work. For his own
convenience, he chose a route along the right
of way of defendant instead of along the city
streets. Both routes were feasible. He was
under no orders until he reached his place of
work. This right of way was not a railroad
yard through which he must pass to reach his
place of work. While on the right of way and
still a quarter of a mile from his place of
work, he met with the accident. (Id. at 65859.)
On these facts, the court held, "we reach the unavoidable
conclusion that plaintiff was not engaged in interstate commerce
at the time of the accident.

He was not on duty; he was simply

going to a place where he would be on duty."

Ld. at 60.

Likewise, in Svmonski v. Central Railroad Co., 131 A.
628 (N.J. 1926), aff'd, 135 A. 921 (1927) a judgment in favor of
recovery was reversed because the injury occurred while the
plaintiff chose to walk along the defendant's right-of-way and
tracks to get to the train station from where he would then
travel to the roundhouse where he was employed to perform his
duties.

The plaintiff chose this route rather than to approach

the station by way of stairs provided by the defendant.

Hence,

just as in the commuter cases, the plaintiff's exercise of his
own choice and the defendant's lack of control prevented the
plaintiff from being able to recover under the FELA, even though

the employee was injured while on his employer's property.

id.

at 629-30.
In the instant action, Ruiz had a way to get to the
work site that was under the control of the Defendant.

He could

have travelled with the rest of his gang in Defendant's truck, as
he had done prior to the accident.

Had he done so on the day of

the accident, Defendant could have assured his safety through,
among other things, its maintenance of the truck, control of the
speed it was driven and required use of seat belts.

However,

Plaintiff chose not to take advantage of the transportation
provided by Defendant.

Instead, for his own personal reasons, he

chose to take his own car at his own time, and he crashed before
he arrived at the work site.

By driving his own car, Ruiz was

not pursuing the interests of the Defendant.
own interests.

He was pursuing his

This is not a case where Ruiz already had arrived

at work and was necessarily traversing the work site to get to
the exact location where he was to work that day.

Plaintiff was

exercising his own choice with respect to the manner and means by
which he travelled to the work site.
C.

On Call Case
Plaintiff also cites to Temple v. Southern Pacific

Transportation Co., 164 Cal. Rptr. 780 (Cal.App.l Dist. 1980)
which is an "on call" case.

In Temple, a brakeman, who was on a

layover, was involved in a car accident when responding to a call
from his employer to return to duty.

After his period of rest,

he was required by his employer to be available to report back to
work when called by the dispatcher.
Id. at 782.

His time was not his own.

Because the employee's acts, at the time of the

accident, were in response to the orders of his employer and were
producing the result desired by his employer, it was held that an
issue of fact existed as to whether he was within the course of
his employment at the time.

Id. at 783-83.

Ruiz was not on call to respond to his employer's needs
when driving his car for his own purposes, nor was he responding
to an order of his employer.

If he had been responding to his

employer's orders rather than his own wishes, he would have
submitted himself to the control and direction of his supervisor
at the camp site with the rest of the work gang rather than take
his own car and leave at a time of his own choosing.

Indeed,

Plaintiff's choice as to the time when he left the work camp was
directly related to the speed at which he would have to travel to
catch up with the company truck by the time it reached the work
site.

Defendant had no interest in Plaintiff leaving latter than

the others in order to go to the work site, nor did Defendant
have any interest in Plaintiff speeding in order to get to the
work site on time.

As the lower court found, Ruiz was no more

producing the desired result of his employer when driving his car
than any commuter travelling to a work site.

It is significant

in supporting this conclusion that at the time of injury
Plaintiff could not be contacted or controlled by Defendant in
any way, and Plaintiff understood he would not be paid while
acting on his own time for his own benefit.
Plaintiff has not refuted the legal authority of the
commuter cases.

He only has argued for the applicability of camp

site cases, traversing the work site cases and an on call case to
support his position.

These cases, although endorsing similar

principles of choice and lack of control as found in the commuter
cases, are factually distinguishable and provide no support for
Plaintiff upon the undisputed facts of record.

There is no

factual dispute that Plaintiff voluntarily chose to drive his car
for his own benefit.

Defendant received no benefit from

Plaintiff's conduct, and Defendant had no opportunity to control
or direct Plaintiff until he arrived at the work site.
Plaintiff, however, crashed his car 14 miles before he arrived at
the work site.

As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot be found to

have been within the course of his employment when he drove his
car off the road before he arrived at where he was to work, and
the summary judgment granted below should be affirmed.
POINT IV
NO ERROR WAS COMMITTED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
The district court's ruling is consistent with and
supported by FELA case law, as discussed above.
conflicting case authority.

There is no

Plaintiff merely misconstrues the

law for his own benefit.
Contrary to Plaintiff's contentions of error, there is
uncontroverted FELA authority for finding an employee to be
outside the course of his employment when he voluntarily chooses
to commute to work in his own vehicle on his own schedule and for
his own benefit, during which time he was not furthering his
employer's business and was not under the control or direction of
his employer.

Although no case is exactly on point factually,

the commuter cases discussed in Point II, supra, provide the
appropriate analytical framework and the closest analogy.

These

cases focus on the employee's exercise of his own choice and

conduct for his own benefit and the employer's lack of control
and supervision.

In fact, although factually distinguishable,

even the reasoning of the other FELA cases relied upon by
Plaintiff support the ruling of the lower court.

Hence, summary

judgment is completely in harmony with FELA principles and case
law.
Plaintiff also suggests, without any legal authority,
that the district court could not hold upon the facts before it
that Plaintiff voluntarily took himself out of the course of his
employment when he substituted personal transportation for
company transportation for personal reasons, and removed himself
from the control and supervision of his employer.4

Plaintiff

did not elect to take his car to the work site for the benefit of
the Defendant and this election in no way benefitted the
Defendant.

In reality, the contrary is true.

Plaintiff's

voluntary election resulted in his leaving the camp site later
than his co-workers.

Had Plaintiff travelled at the same speed

of those travelling under the control of the Defendant, the
Plaintiff's choice would have made it impossible for him to have
been at the work site as early as the rest of his work gang.
Defendant has no interest in its employees pursuing personal
objectives that make them late for work or for its employees to
speed in order to get to work because they have pursued their own
objectives.

It is ludicrous for Plaintiff to argue that, in

essence, no matter what he did for personal reasons he could not
4

Before the court below, Plaintiff argued that
45 U.S.C. § 152 prevented him from taking himself out of the
course of his employment. Plaintiff has abandoned this argument
on appeal for very sound reasons. See R. 479-81.

remove himself from the course of his employment.

The Wottle.

Loya, Fowler and Rogers cases, discussed above, expressly negate
this argument.5

There are no cases supporting Plaintiff's

argument.
In addition, Plaintiff tries to argue that genuine
issues of fact exist.

However, Plaintiff does not clearly

identify any issue of fact and what conflicting evidence exists
to which Defendant can respond.

It appears that Plaintiff simply

is trying to create an issue of fact by arguing that the Union
Agreement required Defendant to pay Plaintiff for the time he
spent driving his own car to work, and that this fact supports
the legal conclusion that Plaintiff was within the course of his
employment.

This straw-man argument fails because there is no

competent evidence of record that the Union Agreement required
that Plaintiff be paid for the time he spent driving his own car.
The Union Agreement expressly provides that employees will not be
paid when travelling for personal reasons.

(R. 369.)

Moreover, even if Plaintiff was entitled to
compensation under the Union Agreement, Plaintiff still would be
outside the course of his employment.

As in the Fowler case,

when an employee who is at work pursues his own personal
interests he takes himself out of the course of employment with
respect to that activity; and as in the Lova case, this is true
even when the employee is being compensated.

Plaintiff clearly

took himself out of the course of his employment by the very act
of his pursuing his own interests separate and apart from his

5

See text, supra, at pp. 20-21.

agreement not to be paid in exchange for being released by his
employer from his usual and customary duties of reporting to work
with his gang and submitting to his employer's control and
supervision.

Hence, Plaintiff was outside the course of his

employment regardless of whether or not the Union Agreement
allowed Plaintiff to claim pay during his commute as a
contractual benefit of his employment.
Finally, Plaintiff feebly argues that his agreement not
to be paid in order to be free to pursue his own interests is an
agreement to avoid FELA coverage in violation of 45 U.S.C. § 55.
This argument is nonsensical.

First, Plaintiff has not cited to

any facts of record that the parties agreed that Defendant's
future FELA liability would be limited.

Plaintiff's voluntary

agreement not to be paid for his time certainly was not done to
limit FELA coverage.

Nobody expected an accident to happen.

This agreement simply is further evidence that, indeed, Plaintiff
was pursuing his own objectives and not those of his employer, of
which the legal result is that Plaintiff was outside the course
of his employment and should not be paid.

Second, if the case

law is against Plaintiff on the course of employment issue, as
established above, the FELA would not apply, including Section
55.

Plaintiff was outside the scope of his employment as a

matter of law even if there had been no agreement regarding
compensation.

Thus, it would be irrelevant that the agreement

not to be paid also limited FELA coverage.
Plaintiff has not, and cannot, show any reversible
error made by the district court.
clear and undisputed.
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The law and the facts are

Plaintiff's action fails as a matter of
_ ^ ^ _
J

J

law because there is no FELA coverage of his purely personal
activity.

The district court's ruling and order should be

affirmed.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff is not without recourse simply because the
FELA is not applicable.

Just as the FELA requires proof of

negligence, so can Plaintiff pursue a common law negligence
action against Southern Pacific as a landowner.

In fact, the

trial court advised Plaintiff of this option and Plaintiff has
filed such a separate action against Defendant.
With respect to the instant FELA action, however,
Plaintiff was not injured while performing any activity required
for him to be able to do his work.

He was pursuing personal

objectives in getting to work that benefitted only him, as does
every commuter who elects to drive his or her own car rather than
take other available modes of transportation.

Plaintiff could

have gone, and was invited to go, to the work site in Defendant's
truck.

Because Plaintiff exercised his freedom to chose his own

desires rather than to report for duty at Montello, Defendant had
no control or ability to supervise him at the time he was injured
while he was driving his own car.
Upon the undisputed facts, Plaintiff is not entitled to
the benefits of the FELA because he was not within the course of
his employment as a matter of law.

The order of summary judgment

in favor of Defendant must be affirmed.

Pursuant to Rule 34,

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the Court also should award
Defendant its costs.

Dated t h i s /<3^ A day of June, 1995.
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
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E. Scott Savage
Casey K. McGarvey
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellee
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Unpublished Disposition
(Cite as: 993 F.2d 1551, 1993 WL 147505 (10th Cir.(Colo.)))
NOTICE: Although citation of unpublished
opinions remains unfavored, unpublished
opinions may now be cited if the opinion has
persuasive value on a material issue, and a
copy is attached to the citing document or, if
cited in oral argument, copies are furnished to
the Court and all parties. See General Order
of November 29, 1993, suspending 10th Cir.
Rule 36.3 until December 31, 1995, or further
order.
(The decision of the Court is referenced in a
"Table of Decisions Without
Reported
Opinions" appearing in the Federal Reporter.)
Marta LOYA, as Personal Representative
of the Estate of Hector Loya, PlaintiffAppellant,
v.
DENVER & RIO G R A N D E WESTERN
RAILROAD COMPANY, DefendantAppellee.
No. 92-1076.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
May 5, 1993.
D.Colo., No. 91-N-575.
D.Colo.
AFFIRMED.
Before MCKAY and EBEL, Circuit Judges,
and LEONARD, District Judge. [FN1]
ORDER AND JUDGMENT [FN*]
EBEL, Circuit Judge.
**1 The Plaintiff-Appellant's
deceased
husband, Hector Loya, was a maintenance-ofway worker employed by the DefendantAppellee, Denver and Rio Grande Western
Railroad Company ["the Railroad"].
On
Sunday, April 9, 1989, Mr. Loya was
returning from his permanent home in Denver
to his place of employment near Silt,
Colorado, approximately 170 miles west of
,C^>«4

Page
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Denver, when he was severely injured in an
automobile accident. Mr. Loya's co-worker,
who was driving the pick-up truck at the time
of the accident, lost control of the truck on a
snowy interstate highway.
Mr. Loya was
thrown from the windshield of the truck into
oncoming traffic and died of his injuries on
May 2, 1989.
Mrs. Loya brought this suit under the
Federal Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), 45
U.S.C. § 51, as personal representative of Mr.
Loya's estate. The district court granted the
Railroad's motion for summary judgment on
the ground that Mr. Loya was not acting
within the scope of his employment at the
time of his injury and thus was not covered by
the FELA. The Plaintiff now appeals the
dismissal of her case.
We review the grant of summary judgment
de novo. Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v. First
Affiliated S e c , Inc., 912 F.2d 1238, 1241 (10th
Cir. 1990). Summary judgment is appropriate
when there is no genuine dispute over a
material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. Rusillo v.
Scarborough, 935 F.2d 1167, 1170 (10th
Cir. 1991). We view the record in the light
most favorable to the Plaintiff.
See
Deepwater Invs., Ltd. v. Jackson Hole Ski
Corp., 938 F.2d 1105, 1110 (10th Cir.1991).
We hold that, taking the evidence in the
light most favorable to the Plaintiff, the
Railroad is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Recovery under the FELA is permitted
only if Mr. Loya's injury occurred "while he
[was] employed by" the Railroad. 45 U.S.C. §
51. We have interpreted this provision as
imposing liability for "not only the actual
work performed in interstate commerce, but
those acts which can be said to be necessarily
incident thereto." Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe R. Co. v. Wottle, 193 F.2d 628, 630 (10th
Cir. 1952). However, we also recognized that
the FELA was not meant to cover all of a
railroad employee's activities:
[G]iven the most liberal interpretation, the
Act cannot be extended to cover activities
not necessarily incident to or an integral
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part of employment in interstate commerce.
It obviously does not cover activities
undertaken by an employee for a private
purpose and having no causal relationship
with his employment.
Wottle, 193 F.2d at 630.
Generally,
employees injured while commuting to and
from work are not considered to be within the
scope of their employment for FELA purposes.
See, e.g., Getty v. Boston and Marine Corp.,
505 F.2d
1226,
1228 (1st
Cir. 1974);
Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Johnson, 265 F.2d
173, 178 (1st Cir. 1959); Quirk v. New York,
Chicago & St. Louis R.R., 189 F.2d 97, 100
(7th Cir.), cert, denied, 342 U.S. 781 (1951);
Sassaman v. Pennsylvania R.R., 144 F.2d 950,
952-54 (3d Cir. 1944); Williams v. Norfolk So.
Ry., 767 F.Supp. 756, 758-59 (E.D.Va.1991);
Spoonamore v. Louisville and Nashville R.R.,
179
F.Supp.
290,
292
(E.D.Ky.1959).
Although courts have been reluctant to
establish a per se rule, this line of cases has
led to a doctrine known as the "commuter
rule."
**2 The Plaintiff contends t h a t Mr. Loya
was under the Railroad's control and therefore
was acting within the scope of his employment
when the accident occurred. She cites several
undisputed facts in support of this contention:
(1) the movable nature of Mr. Loya's
employment site-at which the Railroad
provided living quarters in a railroad car
outfitted with bunks, a kitchen, and a
bathroom-created the necessity for travel,
because his family could not live with him nor
could his children attend school even if they
could live with him at the work site, Aplt. App.
D-25;
F-34;
(2) Mr. Loya's employment
contract stated t h a t "[w]hen conditions of the
work permit," Railroad employees "will be
allowed to make weekend visits to their
home," Aplt. App.
F-35;
(3) Railroad
employees unable to return to work on
Monday were required to notify the Railroad's
Division Offices by 7:30 a.m. Monday,
Aplt.App. D-19; (4) Mr. Loya went to Denver
to do laundry, see his family, and buy
groceries because he could not read English
food labels and the grocery stores near his
workplace did not carry the Mexican foods he
liked, Aplt.App. H-41, 46; and (5) Mr. Loya
ACL£0.
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was paid a per diem of $9.95 per day,
including Saturdays and Sundays, as long as
he was not voluntarily absent from work on
Monday and Friday, Aplt.App. D-20, F-34.
Taking these facts as true, we nevertheless
believe that no reasonable jury could find for
the Plaintiff and that summary judgment was
therefore proper. This case is governed by the
commuter rule and Wottle. In Wottle, the
railroad employee
was responsible
for
providing food and bedding for his own use in
the bunk car. We held that the employee's
trip to purchase groceries could not be
considered within the scope of FELA coverage
because "he was on a mission wholly
unconnected
and
unrelated
to
his
employment." 193 F.2d at 631. Given that
Mr. Loya made voluntary choices as to where
to buy his food and how to travel to his
permanent home, we decline to hold on the
facts of this case t h a t there existed the level of
control by the Railroad necessary to constitute
employment or acts incident thereto. Nor do
we find indicative of Railroad control the fact
that Mr. Loya had to notify the Railroad if he
could not attend work on Mondays or the fact
that Mr. Loya could be required to work on
weekends.
The major distinction between Wottle and
Mr. Loya's case is t h a t Mr. Loya received a
daily per diem for the purchase of food and
linens, even when he did not work on
Saturdays and Sundays. Although pay can be
an indicia of control by the employer and
therefore an indication that Mr. Loya was
within the scope of employment, the per diem
in this case merely served as an incentive for
Mr. Loya to come to work on Monday because
per diem was not paid for the weekend unless
the employee showed up for work on Monday.
The payment of a per diem, in the absence of
other evidence of control by the Railroad, does
not indicate t h a t Mr. Loya was acting within
the scope of his employment at the time of the
accident.
**3 Indeed, a number of facts compel the
conclusion that the Railroad exercised no
control over Mr. Loya's weekend activities.
Mr. Loya chose to go to Denver, chose when to
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go to Denver and when to return to Silt, chose
the means of transportation, and chose the
route of travel. There are no facts supporting
a finding that the Railroad exercised control
over Mr. Loya at the time of the accident or
that Mr. Loya was acting within the scope of
his employment at the time of the accident.
We therefore AFFIRM the district court's
order granting the Railroad's motion for
summary judgment.
FN1. The Honorable Timothy D. Leonard,
United States District Judge for the
Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by
designation.
FN* This order and judgment has no
precedential value and shall not be cited,
or used by any court within the Tenth
Circuit,
except
for
purposes
of
establishing the doctrines of the law of
the case, res judicata, or collateral
estoppel. 10th Cir.R. 36.3.
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